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Abstract
Background: One of the key functions of health insurance is to provide financial protection against high costs of
health care, yet evidence of such protection from developing countries has been inconsistent. The current study
uses the case of Ghana to contribute to the evidence pool about insurance’s financial protection effects. It
evaluates the impact of the country’s National Health Insurance Scheme on households’ out-of-pocket spending
and catastrophic health expenditure.
Methods: We use data from a household survey conducted in two rural districts, Nkoranza and Offinso, in 2007,
two years after the initiation of the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme. To address the skewness of health
expenditure data, the absolute amount of out-of-pocket spending is estimated using a two-part model. We also
conduct a probit estimate of the likelihood of catastrophic health expenditures, defined at different thresholds
relative to household income and non-food consumption expenditure. The analysis controls for chronic and self-
assessed health conditions, which typically drive adverse selection in insurance.
Results: At the time of the survey, insurance coverage was 35 percent. Although the benefit package of insurance
is generous, insured people still incurred out-of-pocket payment for care from informal sources and for uncovered
drugs and tests at health facilities. Nevertheless, they paid significantly less than the uninsured. Insurance has been
shown to have a protective effect against the financial burden of health care, reducing significantly the likelihood
of incurring catastrophic payment. The effect is particularly remarkable among the poorest quintile of the sample.
Conclusions: Findings from this study confirm the positive financial protection effect of health insurance in Ghana.
The effect is stronger among the poor group than among general population. The results are encouraging for
many low income countries who are considering a similar policy to expand social health insurance. Ghana’s
experience also shows that instituting insurance by itself is not adequate to remove fully the out-of-pocket
payment for health. Further works are needed to address the supply side’s incentives and quality of care, so that
the insured can enjoy the full benefits of insurance.
Background
The World Bank [1] posited that for any health finan-
cing coverage, there are generally three interrelated and
separate dimensions: the breadth (number of people
covered), the depth (the extent of services covered), and
the resulting impacts on health outcomes and financial
protection against large out-of-pocket (OOP) expendi-
tures. While documenting the first two dimensions is
rather straightforward, evaluating the impacts of health
financing interventions is not an easy undertaking. To
date, the evidence of impact on health outcomes is
scarce and that on financial protection does not support
a unanimous conclusion. Regarding the latter, while
many studies show that insurance helped reducing the
OOP health spending [2,3], others found that, by alter-
ing the utilization patterns, insurance could lead to
increased OOP expenditure [4] and higher likelihood of
catastrophic payment [5,6].
The current study analyzes the case of Ghana National
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and contributes to
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coverage. Using data from two rural districts of Ghana,
we evaluate the potential protective impact of NHIS on
the financial burden of health care as measured in the
total OOP amount spent on health and the probability
that an individual encounters catastrophic health pay-
ment. While several studies have looked at the imple-
mentation aspect of NHIS [7], its equity implications in
terms membership composition [8], and its impact on
service utilization [9], to our knowledge there has been
no in-depth assessment of the NHIS’s financial protec-
tion effect. Yet this is the principal policy objective for
the NHIS, as expressed in the Ghanaian government’s
national health insurance policy framework:
“Within the next five years, every resident of Ghana
shall belong to a health insurance scheme that ade-
quately covers him or her against the need to pay
o u to fp o c k e ta tt h ep o i n to fs e r v i c eu s ei no r d e rt o
obtain access to a defined package of acceptable
quality of health service.”
[10, cited in 7]
The next section provides an overview of Ghana’s
health financing and the NHIS. This is followed by a
description of the methods used to address the study’s
research questions. We next present our results and dis-
cuss the implications of the study’s findings. The final
section concludes.
Overview of Ghana’s Health Financing and the NHIS
With a gross domestic product per capita of US$ 306 in
2007, Ghana is a low income country in the sub-
Saharan Africa region. The country compares positively
with peers in sub-Saharan Africa in a number of impor-
tant health indicators, such as maternal and child mor-
tality, fertility rate, and HIV/AIDS prevalence among
adults ages 15-49 [11]. However, Ghana also pays more
for health as percentage of gross domestic product (6.2
percent in Ghana compared to the sub-Saharan Africa’s
average of 5.3 percent in 2006) [11].
Similar to many countries coming out of the colonial
regime, after independence in 1957, the Ghanaian gov-
ernment adopted a tax-based health financing system in
which the government paid for services in the public
sector. By the early 1970s, general tax revenue in
Ghana, with its stagnating economy, could not support
a tax-based health financing system. Ghana started to
introduce nominal user fees in the public sector, which
in 1985 were raised significantly with the aim to recover
at least 15% of recurrent expenditure [7]. This user fee
system, known as “cash and carry,” was shown to leave
negative consequences in access to health services, espe-
cially by the poor people [12,13]. To offset the adverse
effects of user fees, the government introduced exemp-
tion policy for children, pregnant women, the elderly,
the extreme indigents, and persons suffering from cer-
tain communicable diseases. In practice the exemption
did not work well, and many of those who should have
been exempted were not [14]. A number of adverse
effects of the “cash and carry” system have been
reported, including long delays in seeking health services
when ill and incomplete prescription purchases [15]. In
the beginning of the years 2000s, the share of household
OOP payment in total health expenditure in Ghana was
considerably higher than the regional average for the
sub-Saharan Africa (50 percent versus 39 percent
respectively in 2006) [11].
The establishment of the NHIS in 2003 is a major step
by the Ghanaian government to address the perverse pro-
blems of the “cash and carry” system. NHIS was fueled
partly by the relative success of the numerous mutual
health organizations (MHOs), which existed in 67 out of
138 districts in Ghana with very diverse management
structures and benefit packages [16]. However, NHIS
marks an important departure from the MHO prepay-
ment mechanism. It mandated the establishment of an
MHO in every district and contracted existing private
health insurance schemes. Although the administration
of NHIS remains decentralized at the district level, its
financing is centralized and the benefit package is stan-
dardized across the whole country. NHIS’s benefit pack-
age covers a wide range of outpatient services with
associated drugs and lab tests, inpatient care, treatment
of cervical and breast cancers, basic oral health services,
eye care, maternal care, and all emergency conditions.
No coinsurance, copayment, or deductible is required at
the point of service [17]. All Ghanaians, from both the
formal and informal sectors, are in principle required to
enroll. Public health facilities in the country are automa-
tically accredited to contract with the NHIS, and private
health facilities can apply for accreditation. It is estimated
that in 2008, 479 private facilities were accredited while a
larger number remained without accreditation [18].
Funding for NHIS comes mainly from a National Health
Insurance sales tax of 2.5 percent, a transfer of 2.5 percent
of formal sector contributions to the Social Security and
Pension Scheme Fund, and from member contributions.
In the beginning years of the scheme, 70 - 75 percent of
total insurance revenue came from tax revenue, 20-25
percent from formal sector contribution, and only about
5 percent from contribution of members in the informal
sector [19]. Premium is exempted for several member
categories, including Social Security and National Insur-
ance Trust Fund pensioners, children under age 18, adults
above age 70, and the indigents [19]. As of 2008, the NHIS
provided 41 percent of the total public resource envelope
and about 45 percent of the Ghanaian population were
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outperforms the targets set in the policy document,
which aims to insure 30-40 percent of the population by
2010 [16].
Early experience in the implementation of NHIS
reveals a number of problems. Despite the explicit pol-
icy to exempt premium for the indigents, poor people
were much less likely to be insured than the better off
[8,9]. There has been serious delay in issuing cards for
members, as well as in reimbursing the providers. Delay
in provider reimbursement and inadequate supply side
incentives are deemed responsible for the lower quality
of care received by insured patients compared to non-
insured, paying patients. Anecdotal examples of poor
quality of care include provider discrimination against
insured patients, long waiting time, low likelihood of
being seen by a doctor and of receiving all drugs pre-
scribed [18]. In particular, it has been reported that pro-
viders commonly solicited informal payments from the
patients by charging for services out-of-hours, asking
patients to pay for drugs, which are said not to be in
stock, and asking patients to pay for “better” drugs, said
to be not provided under the NHIS [18].
To date the impact of NHIS on health service utiliza-
tion and OOP expenditure has not been rigorously eval-
uated at the national level. Several studies conducted in
a small number of districts suggested that NHIS has
encouraged utilization of curative health services [9,20].
None of these studies, however, successfully dealt with
the issue of adverse selection of NHIS membership.
Methods
Measures of the Financial Protection Effects of Health
Insurance
One of the key values of health insurance is to help peo-
ple deal with the unpredictability of illness and medical
spending [21]. It is well known that health expenditure
is extremely variable and skewed, with a disproportio-
nately large amount usually concentrated in a small por-
tion of the population. For example, data from the
United States in 1987 show that the top 10 percent of
users account for nearly 75 percent of total medical
spending [22]. Without a proper risk pooling mechan-
ism, households that are unfortunate enough to have
catastrophic illnesses will find it very difficult to cover
the medical bills. The financial consequences of ill
health can be especially devastating for poor people,
who already struggle to cover the basic daily needs such
as food and shelter. A recent analysis of 15 African
countries revealed that in most of these countries,
around 30 percent of all households financed OOP
health expenditure by borrowing and selling assets [23].
Health insurance is designed to reduce the amount that
households have to pay OOP when they use medical
services.
Looking at the absolute amount of OOP payment
changed as the result of having health insurance is not
adequate to judge its effect on the financial burden of
health care. Low OOP payment may just derive from
the fact that insurance does not trigger any increase in
utilization; hence no additional payment is needed. On
the other hand, high OOP payment may not necessarily
be bad if it buys substantial improvements in quality
and/or quantity of services and if the households can
afford to pay [6]. Thus, the issue of financial burden is
more directly related to capacity to pay than to the
absolute amount.
Along this line of argument, Wagstaff and van Door-
slaer [24] defined a concept of “catastrophic” health
expenditure - expenditure that exceeds some pre-
specified fraction of household income. The idea is that
health spending comes at the expense of other house-
hold consumption expenditure, and health spending
s h o u l dn o te x c e e dac e r t a i nt h r e s h o l dz ,s ot h a th o u s e -
holds have at least (1-z) of their income to spend on
other needs. The catastrophic expenditure indicator is a
commonly accepted tool for measuring the financial
burden of health care relative to the household capacity
to pay. The concept has been employed widely to por-
tray the health financing profile and to evaluate the
impact of health insurance in many countries [5,25-27].
Although one may argue that z should vary by income
level, because rich people may afford to spend higher
portion of their income on health compared to the
poor, no theoretical or empirical work has been con-
ducted to date to address this issue.
Following the practice of the existing literature, we
adopt two measures of the financial protection effects of
insurance in this study. They include the absolute
amount of OOP expenditure and the likelihood of high
or catastrophic expenditure.
Model Specifications
A generic model for estimating the impact of health
insurance for an individual i with the outcome of inter-
est Y can be estimated as followed:
YF H I X Z      = (, , , )
where the F function in health service research typi-
cally takes the form of linear, probit, logit, or poisson
depending on the distribution of the outcome variable,
HI denotes insurance status, X is a vector of observable
characteristics, Z is a vector of characteristics unobser-
vable to the researchers, and ε is the stochastic term,
usually assumed to be normally distributed. Note that
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household members.
Because Z is unobservable, it is included in the error
term. The estimate of the health insurance (HI) effect
on Y will be biased if Z contains at least one element
that is systematically correlated with both insurance sta-
tus and the outcome of interest (HI is endogenous). For
example, if Y is a measure of health service utilization,
typical candidates for such an element of Z would be
the individual’s risk aversion or poor health condition,
which are likely to be positively correlated with both
i n s u r a n c ea n dY .I ns u c hac a s e ,f a i l u r et oc o n t r o lf o r
this interfering effect of the omitted variables will lead
to an overestimation of the insurance effect. Unfortu-
nately, while tools for dealing with this omitted variable
bias are widely known (such as randomized controlled
study, individual fixed effects model, or instrumental
variable), in reality these tools often are not readily
available.
In this study, we obtained information on the indivi-
dual chronic health condition and whether the study
respondents assessed their health status as “bad.” While
ultimately there will be other confounding factors that
we have not controlled for, poor health status is a com-
monly cited reason for adverse selection in the insur-
ance literature [21]. Thus being able to account for poor
health status helps improve the validity of the study
findings. More importantly, for the type of outcome stu-
died (health expenditure), failure to control for the
omitted variable bias will likely lead to a lower bound
estimate of the insurance effect, provided that the signs
of correlation between such omitted variable with both
insurance status and the outcome are similar. This abil-
i t yt ob o u n dt h ei n s u r a n c eeffect is important - if we
find some significant result, we know the true effect will
be significant.
Data and Variables
Data
T h ed a t af o rt h i ss t u d yc o m ef r o mah o u s e h o l ds u r v e y
in two districts of Ghana conducted in September-
October 2007. The survey was funded by the United
States Agency for International Development and con-
ducted by the Health Systems 20/20 Project, led by Abt
Associates Inc., in collaboration with the Research and
Development Division of the Ghana Health Services.
The two districts are Nkoranza and Offinso, both pre-
dominantly agricultural and relatively poor. Nkoranza is
o n eo ft h ed i s t r i c t si nt h ec o u n t r yw h e r eaM H Oo p e r -
ated before the NHIS; Offinso had no prior experience
with community-based financing.
Table 1 provides a description of the two study dis-
tricts. The population in the two districts, respectively,
is 130 and 140 thousand, slightly less than the average
for this country of 21 million and 138 districts. As
reflected by the proportion of rural population and the
administrative classification of “deprived” district, Nkor-
anza appears to be more disadvantaged than Offinso.
Correspondingly, insurance registration fees and pre-
miums were set higher in Offinso than in Nkoranza.
According to NHIS administrative data, by 2007, 36 per-
cent of Offinso’s population had registered for NHIS;
the corresponding figure for Nkoranza was 45 percent.
The household survey applied a two-stage cluster sam-
pling approach. In the first stage, municipalities in the
urban and rural areas (towns and villages) were selected
based on population size and geographical dispersion. In
the second stage, households were randomly selected
from each municipality. Insured people were over-
sampled to increase power and sampling weights were
used to adjust for this fact. A total of 2,500 households
were surveyed, giving a final sample of 5,879 individuals
in Offinso and 5,738 in Nkoranza.
Variables
The household survey collected detailed information on
the insurance status of all household members. It
recorded any incidence of illness and injury over the two
weeks preceding the survey, antenatal care, delivery, and
hospitalization over the preceding 12 months, as well as
the associated OOP payment for such events. From this
information, we computed a variable for annual OOP
health expenditure (two-week expenditure multiplies by
26, plus 12-month expenditure on hospitalization and
delivery care). Note that using two-week expenditure on
illness and injury to extrapolate to a 12-month figure
could be problematic due to seasonality of illness and
related health care seeking. However, because the field
survey only last for more than a month, any potential
seasonality problem should be the same for NHIS mem-
bers and non-members. The derived OOP expenditure
variable covers all sources, informal and formal care,
from both the government and private sectors. Note that
this is expenditure associated with specific health pro-
blems only; it does not include preventive care. The sur-
vey also collected information on ownership of land,
a s s e t s( T V ,f r i d g e ,t e l e p h o n e ,b i c y c l e ,m o t o r b i k e ,a n d
car), and living conditions (whether there is electricity,
floor type, type of water, and fuel used for cooking; own-
ing a house, having farmland, and number of rooms in
the house). From this information, a wealth quintile vari-
able was constructed using the principle component
method.
In this study, outcomes of interest include annual
OOP health expenditure on curative care and measures
of catastrophic health payment. For the latter, a practical
difficulty is that the survey did not collect information
on household income or consumption expenditure to be
used for comparison. We therefore use an indirect
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duals in each wealth quintile in the sample with the
average income and non-food consumption expenditure
of the corresponding quintile obtained from Ghana’s lat-
est Living Standard Survey (2005-2006) [28]. In doing
that, we adjusted quintile specific income and non-food
consumption expenditure from the Ghana 2005-2006
Living Standard Survey to 2007 values, taking into
account the inflation rate and real growth in the coun-
try. A closely related approach was adopted by Wagstaff
and Lindelow [6] who defined health spending as “high”
if it exceeded 5 percent of average income in their study
sample. Following the practice in the existing literature,
we constructed four indicators of catastrophic OOP
expenditure, i.e., expenditure that exceeds one of the
following four thresholds: 5 percent of quintile specific
household income per capita, 10 percent of income,
10 percent of non-food consumption expenditure, and
20 percent of non-food consumption expenditure.
The key independent variable of interest is whether an
individual had NHIS at the time of survey. In addition
to education, occupation, and gender of the household
head, the covariates include individual self-reported
chronic health conditions and self-assessed health status,
gender, ethnic Akan, household size, assets and living
conditions, and whether at least one member of the
household joined a local solidarity scheme. These cov-
ariates are included because they can potentially con-
found the insurance - OOP expenditure relationship.
For example, richer households may be more likely to
afford health insurance while paying more for health
services at the same time. Therefore, not controlling for
wealth status may lead to overstating the amount that
insured people pay for health services. The last variable,
membership in a local solidarity scheme, serves as an
indicator of social capital, which could potentially be
correlated with insurance status and health service
outcomes.
Estimation methods
In this paper, binary outcomes will be estimated with a
probit model. While both probit and logit are typically
used for binary outcome, the former is preferred
because it produces estimates for marginal effect, which
shows the difference in the probability of having cata-
strophic payment between the insured and the unin-
sured. For OOP expenditure, a linear model is not
suitable because data are highly skewed with a large
number of zeros. Taking log of expenditure data is also
not preferred because the large number of observations
with zero expenditure will be dropped out. Following
the common practice in health service research, we
employ a two-part model, which adds flexibility by mod-
eling separate processes to explain the probability of
positive expenditure and the average OOP amount [29].
In the first part, the probability of a positive expenditure
is estimated with a probit model and, in the second
part, a log linear model is used for non-zero expendi-
ture. The combined marginal effect of health insurance
is estimated according to Dow and Norton [30] with a
Stata program written by Norton [31].
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the breakdown summary of OOP
health expenditure by insurance status for the study
sample. The sample consists of 4,899 people having
NHIS status (members) and 6,718 people without
NHIS status (non-members), yielding a weighted insur-
ance rate of 35 percent. This rate is lower than the
administrative record of t h eN H I Ss h o w ni nT a b l e1 .
Table 1 Description of the Study Sites
Nkoranza district Offinso district
Demographic and health services
Total population 128,960 138,676
Rural population (%) 69 58
Economic status (administratively classified) “deprived”“ less deprived”
Number of hospitals 1 2
Number of public health centers 12 7
Number of private and mission clinics 1 6
NHIS administrative data
% population registered 45 36
Registration fee (Cedi) 20,000-30,000 20,000-50,000
Annual premium (Cedi) 80,000 150,000
Benefit package 95% of disease conditions. Various services, drugs, and tests belonging to outpatient services, inpatient
care, oral health, maternity care, and emergency care.
Sources: Ghana districts http://www.ghanadistricts.com, Health System 20/20 Project and Ghana Health Services (2009).
Note: Figures on total and rural populations come from 2000 census. All other values are current as of 2007.
Cedi is old Ghana Cedi 2007 current value; exchange rate: 1 USD = 9,302 Cedi (2007).
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have to wait for six months after registration to begin
accessing services, and many received their NHIS card
only after a delay. Therefore, the registration informa-
tion does not give a precise measure of the actual num-
ber of cardholders [18]. Because 99 percent of all
insured people in the sample have NHIS, we ignore
other types of insurance. For simplicity, individuals with
NHIS status will be called “insured” in this analysis.
As shown in Table 2, on average, an insured person
paid 21 thousand Cedi over the 12 months preceding
the survey and an uninsured person paid nearly 30
thousand Cedi (we report old Cedi used before the rede-
nomination of currency in July 2007; exchange rate: US
$1 = Cedi 9,302). Thus, despite the generous benefit
package, insured people still incurred an OOP expense
roughly 72 percent of that paid by uninsured people.
Some interesting observations emerge from Table 2.
First, insured people still report paying for items that
should be covered by insurance, such as consultation fees,
lab expenses, and drugs purchased at the facility (see
description of benefit package in Table 1). This pattern
suggests that the NHIS does not fully shield its members
from OOP payment at the point of service. Second, com-
pared with the uninsured, insured people pay more for
items not covered by insurance, such as informal care,
unofficial payment to providers, and purchase of drugs
outside the facility. The higher amount spent on informal
care among the insured suggests that insured people may
indeed sicker than the uninsured. On the other hand, the
fact that insured people pay more for drugs purchased
outside facility (hence not covered by insurance) and for
“other expenses” provides evidence supporting the earlier
observation that quality of care may be a problem with
insured services. The pooled average of OOP expenditure
among the insured and uninsured is 26,922 Cedi (table
not shown), rather low compared with the country mean
annual per capita income of 3,970,000 Cedi reported in
the Ghana Living Standard Survey 2005-2006 (0.68 per-
cent). This figure also is rather low compared with that of
other developing countries, especially given that insurance
coverage was 35 percent at the time. However, it is impor-
tant to note that this OOP amount only includes expendi-
tures associated with specific illness, hospitalization,
antenatal care, or delivery. Hence it does not capture
expenditures associated with preventive care and purchase
of drugs for health maintenance.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of relevant
variables. For completeness, it also shows the total OOP
expenditure reported in Table 2. As Table 3 shows, only
3-4 percent of the study sample actually incurred any
positive OOP payment for health services. The incidence
of high and catastrophic expenditure ranges from 0.9
percent to 2.8 percent depending on the indicators. Still,
the pattern is very consistent; the incidence of high and
catastrophic OOP expenditures is noticeably lower
among the insured for all measures, suggesting that the
N H I Sd i dh a v es o m ep r o t e c t i v ee f f e c t s .X ue ta l .[ 2 5 ] ,
using Ghana 1998-1999 Living Standard Survey data
and 40 percent of non-food consumption threshold,
estimated a catastrophic incidence rate of 1.3 percent.
For the purpose of checking comparability, we also
computed a catastrophic expenditure variable based on
Xu’s et al. threshold using our method (i.e., employing
quintile-specific income and expenditure data from
Ghana Living Standard Survey 2005-2006 as denomina-
tors). The incidence rate obtained is 0.95 percent, which
is reasonable given that our estimates and those of Xu
et al. used data that were 8-9 years apart. Still, our fig-
ures could be slightly underestimated because the OOP
variable does not cover all expenses, as mentioned
above.
Table 2 Breakdown of OOP Expenditure during 12 Months Preceding the Survey by Insurance Status (Cedi)
Expenditure breakdown NHIS nonmembers
(N = 6,718)
NHIS members
(N = 4,899)
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Acute illnesses and injuries
Informal care 2,839 37,902 4,913 85,028
Consultation fee 3,854 130,912 346 32,528
Lab expenses 1,354 57,391 1,036 42,923
Other expenses 210 9,760 989 50,711
Unofficial payment to providers 174 6,682 472 16,640
Drugs purchased at facility 6,500 103,561 2,709 79,055
Drugs purchased outside facility 2,348 83,133 3,743 90,928
Antenatal care and delivery 6,442 85,419 4,475 82,859
Surgery and hospitalization 6,121 95,147 2,819 79,136
Total 29,843 278,617 21,503 265,705
Note: Cedi is old Ghana Cedi, 2007 current value; exchange rate: 1 USD = 9,302 Cedi (2007).
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people with reported chronic health conditions and bad
health status were twice as large as those among the
uninsured, suggesting that adverse selection exists. How-
ever, health status is not the only factor relating to
insurance. As shown, insured people are more likely to
be female, from ethnic Akan, and living in smaller,
female-headed households and in households with at
least one member joining a local solidarity scheme.
There is also a very strong socioeconomic gradient of
insurance, with coverage being systematically higher
among the urban, wealthy, and highly educated. This
differential coverage of NHIS among socioeconomic
groups has similarly been documented in many other
studies [8,9].
The socioeconomic gradient observation is corrobo-
rated in Figure 1, which plots insurance coverage and
incidences of high and catastrophic payments against
wealth quintiles. As revealed, there is a clear upward
trend in insurance coverage, with the level among rich-
est quintile being more than 2.5 times higher than that
among the poorest quintile (50 percent versus 20 per-
cent, respectively). Correspondingly, there is also a clear
downward pattern of high and catastrophic expenditure,
with poor people having much higher incidence com-
pared with the rich on all measures. Besides the clear
concern about equity in coverage and financial protec-
tion, the patterns in Figure 1 suggest some relationship
between insurance coverage and large OOP payment,
which we will test formally in the subsection that
follows.
The Effect of NHIS on OOP Payment
Table 4 presents the first set of estimation results asses-
sing the effects of NHIS on the absolute amount of
OOP payment. Model 1 controls for self-reported
Table 3 Summary Statistics of the Study Sample
Variables NHIS nonmembers
(N = 6,718)
NHIS members
(N = 4,899)
Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
OOP health expenditure (old Cedi) 29,843 278,617 21,503 265,705
Had positive OOP expenditure 0.042 0.202 0.032 0.177
Health expenditure > = 10% non-food consumption expenditure per capita 0.026 0.158 0.015 0.120
Health expenditure > = 20% non-food consumption expenditure per capita 0.020 0.140 0.009 0.094
Health expenditure > = 10% income per capita 0.021 0.143 0.012 0.108
Health expenditure > = 5% income per capita 0.028 0.164 0.015 0.124
Chronic health condition 0.028 0.164 0.063 0.242
Bad health (self-assessed) 0.014 0.119 0.023 0.149
Male 0.485 0.500 0.444 0.497
Age 22.553 19.202 26.088 22.775
Ethnic Akan 0.672 0.470 0.815 0.389
One hh member in solidarity scheme 0.098 0.297 0.147 0.354
Female-headed household 0.299 0.458 0.347 0.476
Hh head has no education 0.364 0.481 0.291 0.454
Hh head education: primary 0.563 0.496 0.579 0.494
Hh head education: > = secondary 0.073 0.260 0.130 0.337
Hh head not working 0.093 0.290 0.091 0.288
Hh head is farmer/fisherman 0.710 0.454 0.644 0.479
Hh head is government worker 0.039 0.193 0.066 0.248
Hh head is artisan 0.134 0.340 0.171 0.377
Hh head is trader 0.024 0.154 0.028 0.165
Quintile 1 (poorest) 0.275 0.446 0.115 0.319
Quintile 2 0.223 0.416 0.174 0.379
Quintile 3 0.171 0.377 0.210 0.407
Quintile 4 0.184 0.387 0.213 0.409
Quintile 5 0.147 0.354 0.289 0.453
Household size 6.317 3.066 5.932 2.791
Urban 0.116 0.320 0.130 0.336
Note: The statistics are adjusted for sampling weight.
Hh=household.
Cedi is old Ghana Cedi, 2007 current value; exchange rate: 1 USD = 9,302 Cedi (2007).
Nguyen et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2011, 10:4
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/10/1/4
Page 7 of 12chronic health conditions and health status while model
2 omits these variables. Both models include individual
and household characteristics described in table 3,
namely the person’s age, age squared, gender, ethnic
Akan, if s/he is a member of a solidarity scheme, house-
hold size, the household head’s gender, education, and
occupation, as well as household’s assets and living con-
ditions. For clarity of presentation, the effects of these
covariates are not shown in the table because they are
not of primary interest. The key figures of interest are
those for “has HI from NHIS,” which show the marginal
effects of insurance on OOP expenditure. As explained
earlier, these marginal effects, estimated from the two-
part model, combine insurance effects on the probability
of having any OOP payment and the absolute amount
given that a payment is made. The robust standard
errors, adjusted for sampling weight and clustered at the
municipality level, were estimated by boostrapping with
200 replications.
Both models 1 and 2 show that the insurance effect is
in the expected direction, i.e. insurance has been shown
to reduce OOP among its members. The marginal
effects of insurance are smaller (in absolute value) when
negative health status indicators are not controlled for
(model 2 compared to model 1), suggesting that the
derived estimates could be on the lower bound if
adverse selection due to poor health status has not been
fully controlled for. If there remain omitted variables
that drive adverse selection in the same way as health
status (e.g., residual wealth status), the true insurance
effect will be larger than that observed in models 1
and 2.
It is noteworthy that in model 1, insurance effect is
only marginally significant (at 10 percent level) and
rather small (33,821 old Cedi). To examine its magni-
tude relative to household capacity to pay, we compare
that amount with the average figure on household non-
food consumption expenditure from Brong Ahafo
region, where Nkoranza is located. We take the house-
hold non-food consumption expenditure per capita for
Brong Ahafo reported in the Ghana Living Standard
Survey 2005-2006 (Tables 9.2 and 9.5) [28] and adjust it
for inflation and real growth to obtain the comparable
figure for 2007, which is 2,701,300 Cedi. Thus, an effect
of 33,821 Cedi would be equal to 1.25 percent of non-
food consumption expenditure, which is not substantial.
Again, it is important to keep in mind the large confi-
dence interval of this estimate (0.24 percent-2.75 per-
cent of non-food consumption expenditure).
The Effect of NHIS on Catastrophic Health Payment
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the various cata-
strophic OOP payment measures. All estimations control
for health status and usual individual and household char-
acteristics. A clear and consistent pattern emerges across
all measures: having NHIS significantly reduced the prob-
ability of catastrophic OOP payment on health services.
The estimated reduction ranges from 0.5 percentage point
(for expenditure of at least 20 percent of non-food expen-
diture) to 1 percentage point (for expenditure of at least
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Figure 1 NHIS Status and Incidence of Catastrophic OOP
Expenditures among Wealth Quintiles Note: underlying figures
are from the data used in this study, which consist of 11,617
individuals surveyed in 2007 in two rural districts Nkoranza and
Offinso. Statistics are adjusted using sampling weights.
Table 4 The Effect of NHIS on Average OOP Expenditure
(Cedi)
OOP on health services
(Two-part model)
(1) (2)
Has HI from NHIS -33,821 -30,094
(20,379)* (20,157)
Chronic health condition 40,605 —
(38,229)
Bad health (self-assessed) 125,223 —
(90,323)
Offinso district 12,946 13,032
(5,205)** (4,362)***
Individual and household characteristics Yes Yes
Assets and living conditions Yes Yes
N 11,617 11,617
Note: Cedi is old Ghana Cedi, 2007 current value; exchange rate: 1 USD =
9,302 Cedi (2007).
Individual and household characteristics include gende, ethnic Akan, age, age
squared, if a member in solidarity scheme, household size, and gender,
education, and occupation of the household head.
Assets include radio, TV, fridge, telephone, bicycle, motorbike, and car.
Household living conditions include whether there is electricity, floor type,
type of water, and fuel used for cooking; owning a house, having farmland,
and number of rooms in the house.
Figures presented are marginal effects of NHIS and their robust standard
errors (in parentheses), adjusted for sampling weight and clustering effect at
the municipality level. The standard errors are estimated by boostrapping
with 200 replications.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Page 8 of 125 percent of income). In relative terms, a reduction of 1
percentage point would be 67 percent compared with the
mean of the insured and 36 percent compared with the
mean of the uninsured (Table 3). Consistent with the find-
ing on OOP expenditure, males have a significantly lower
incidence of catastrophic payment. Interestingly, while
Offinso is less poor than Nkoranza, Offinso residents were
more likely to incur catastrophic payment. Because
Offinso has more hospitals, more private and mission
clinics, and higher insurance premiums and registration
fees, it is possible that the price of services is also higher in
Offinso, which explains higher incidence of catastrophic
payment. However, further data and investigation are
needed to form a rigorous explanation of the difference
between the two study districts.
A question of interest is whether the effect of insur-
ance works differently for the poor versus non-poor.
We examine this by performing separate estimations for
the poorest 20 percent versus the rest of the sample.
The results, presented in Table 6, are telling. The effects
of insurance are large and strongly significant in all
measures among the poor, while marginally or non-
significant among the rest of the sample. In fact, most
of the average effect observed in Table 4 actually comes
from effect among the poor. For the rest of the popula-
tion, the effects have the expected direction of effects,
but are too small to yield any statistical significance.
Discussion
This study finds evidence that the NHIS in Nkoranza
and Offinso has helped reducing the incidence of cata-
strophic OOP expenditure among its members. Depend-
ing on the indicators, the probabilities of catastrophic
expenditure decreased by 0.5 to 1 percentage point
among NHIS members, a reduction of 36 percent to 67
percent of the sample means. In terms of the absolute
amount of OOP expenditure, insurance’s marginal effect
is small and only significant at 10 percent. These see-
mingly contradictory patterns can be explained by the
higher volume of service consumed by insured patients,
as shown in the existing literature [9,20], and by the fact
that OOP payment did take place at the point of service
even for the insured. Still, insurance has served its func-
tion as a safety net mechanism, reducing the probability
that households have to forego other subsistent needs
for health care.
The protective effect of insurance against catastrophic
expenditure is particularly strong among the poor, who
are typically more vulnerable to health shocks than the
rest of the population. This finding supports the Gha-
naian government’s decision to exempt premium for the
indigenous. In fact, given that insurance coverage is sub-
stantially lower among poor people, further efforts are
needed to enroll this vulnerable population. For exam-
ple, the criteria for being considered as “indigent,” and
hence exempted from premiums, are currently too strict
[9]. They exclude many people who are poor but not
poor enough to enjoy free insurance. The government
may decide to relax the criteria and implement more
promotion activities in order to enroll a larger pool of
the poor people.
A closer examination of the results of this study
reveals a more complicated picture. Despites NHIS’s
generous benefit packages, its members still incurred an
OOP payment that equals 72 percent of that incurred
by nonmembers. A nontrivial portion of this amount is
Table 5 The Effect of NHIS on Various Indicators of Catastrophic OOP Expenditure on Health
Thresholds 5% income 10% non-food expenditure 10% income 20% non-food expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Has HI from NHIS -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005
(0.004)*** (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.002)**
Chronic health condition 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.014
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
Bad health (self-assessed) 0.048 0.042 0.041 0.033
(0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023)
Offinso district 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Other individual and household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,617 11,617 11,617 11.617
Note:Individual and household characteristics include gender, ethnic Akan, age, age squared, if a member in solidarity scheme, household size, and gender,
education, and occupation of the household head.
Assets include radio, TV, fridge, telephone, bicycle, motorbike, and car. Household living conditions include whether there is electricity, floor type, type of water,
and fuel used for cooking; owning a house, having farmland, and number of rooms in the house.
Figures presented are marginal effects of NHIS and their robust standard errors (in parentheses), adjusted for sampling weight and clustering effect at the
municipality level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Page 9 of 12spent on items that should be covered by insurance,
such as drugs, tests, antenatal care, and hospitalization.
These findings raise a number of questions on the
implementation aspects of insurance which are highly
related to the early experience with NHIS reported in
the existing literature [18]. For example, is there a ten-
dency for providers to direct insured patients to services,
drugs, and tests that are not covered by insurance, so
that they can collect more revenue? Is the quality of
care comparable in the services rendered to the insured
and uninsured patients? Is the procedure cumbersome
enough to discourage the patients from obtaining
insured services? What are the possible advantages of
the unaccredited facilities, such as convenience and
quality, that attract insured patients to go there knowing
that they will have to pay out of pocket?
As noted earlier, because OOP payment is the net
effect of the change in unit price and volume of services
utilized, the presence of OOP payment among the
insured is not necessarily bad. It has been shown that
NHIS has brought about a significant increase in health
care demand among its members [8,9]. Insured people
thus may be willing to pay to obtain extra services and
tests that they may not have had without insurance.
This “access value” of insurance has been documented
elsewhere and can well be the case with Ghana [32].
The current analysis ultimately has some limitations.
We have not been able to address fully the selectivity of
insurance. Although we can control for chronic condi-
tions and self-assessed bad health status, there remain
potentially omitted variables that bias these results. As
such, the documented association may not represent the
true magnitude of the NHIS effects on the outcomes of
interest. Most likely, we believe that bias, if exists, will
make the results conservative and the true magnitude of
the effects may be higher than what is documented
here. The second drawback results from the lack of
h o u s e h o l di n c o m ea n de x p e n d i t u r ed a t ai no u rs a m p l e ,
which renders the estimates imprecise. The low percen-
tage of the studied population having had any positive
health expenditure and the skewness of expenditure
data have always been a challenge in health service
research. Finally, our results only pertain to two out of
138 districts of Ghana, and hence cannot be generalized
to the country as a whole.
Future studies can build on this research in many
respects. For example, to assess more systematically the
equity aspect of the Ghana NHIS, benefit incidence ana-
lysis would be suitable to document how much people
with different wealth status benefit from the NHIS.
With better data, one could explore the effects of differ-
entiating the threshold z for catastrophic health expen-
diture across income levels. It would be useful to
quantify the degree of adverse selection as it will affect
the financial viability of the insurance fund, especially
when coverage is still low. Moral hazard from members
could eventually become a problem with the NHIS due
to the generous benefit package and lack of require-
ments for coinsurance. Finally, some in-depth case stu-
dies will be useful to shed light on the operational
aspects of NHIS and on quality of care for its members.
Conclusion
Limitations notwithstanding, this study makes a poten-
tially valuable contribution to the evaluation of the
Ghana NHIS in particular and impact evaluation of
health insurance in general. It shows that with strong
commitment to social health insurance , a poor country
can achieve financial protection against health care cost
for its population, in particular the most vulnerable
group. Another lesson learnt from Ghana is that insti-
tuting insurance by itself is not adequate to remove fully
the out-of-pocket payment for health care. Insured
patients are still required to pay for items that should
be covered by insurance and for informal care. Without
proper regulation and incentives for the supply side to
improve quality and availability of services, insurance
cannot be an attractive product. This in turn will be a
hindering factor in coverage expansion and ultimately
will affect the prospect of achieving universal coverage.
Ghana’s experience is applicable to many developing
countries, especially the countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
The context for social health insurance is rather similar.
Most countries in the sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s
and 1990s underwent health financing reform where
user fees in the public facilities were instituted and dif-
ferent forms of the MHOs were piloted. Social health
insurance is being considered as a way to go for alleviat-
ing financial burden and improve access to health
Table 6 The Differential Effect of NHIS on the Incidence
of Catastrophic OOP Expenditure on Health by Wealth
Status
Indicators Poorest
quintile
N = 1,762
Rest of
population
N = 9,855
Exceeds 5% of income -0.016 (0.005)*** -0.007 (0.004)
Exceeds 10% of non-food
expenditure
-0.017 (0.005)*** -0.004 (0.004)
Exceeds 10% of income -0.013 (0.005)** -0.004 (0.003)
Exceeds 20% of non-food
expenditure
-0.014 (0.005)*** - 0.003 (0.002)*
Note:Figures are obtained from separate estimations among the poorest and
the rest of the sample. The models control for self-reported chronic health
conditions and bad health status, all individual and household
characteristics, assets and housing conditions, and district dummy. Figures
presented are marginal effects of NHIS and their robust standard errors (in
parentheses), adjusted for sampling weight and clustering effect at the
municipality level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Page 10 of 12services. The results on protection effect against cata-
strophic OOP expenditure are encouraging for many
low income countries, which are on the way to develop
and expand their social health insurance.
Appendix
Proof of the sign of bias in linear models
Suppose there is only one variable in Z, called z, that
is systematically associated with HI status and Y, then
the true relationship between Y, HI, and z can by mod-
eled as:
YH I z 11 1 1 =+ + +    (1)
Not being able to observe z, we could wrongly model
the relationship as:
YH I 22 2 =+ +   (2)
Because z is systematically related to HI, the relation-
ship between them can be specified as:
zH I 33 3 =+ +   (3)
Substitute (3) in (1), we have:
Y H I 11 3 11 3 1 31 =+ ++ + + () () ( )      
Thus, without controlling for z, the estimated effect of
HI is (b1+ g1δ3), while the true underlying effect is b1.
g1δ3 is the bias caused by omitting z. If z is something
that is positively correlated with both insurance and
health expenditure (such as poor underlying health), both
g1 and δ3 will be positive and the bias will be positive.
Note that the bias is positive as well if z is negatively cor-
related to both insurance and health expenditure (such as
low wealth status). Because the expected insurance effect
on Y in this study is negative (a reduction in OOP), a
positive bias will result in an estimation that is smaller
than the true effect in absolute value.
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